INTRODUCTION
IT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED for some time that, in the presence of moral hazard, market allocations under uncertainty will not be unconstrained Pareto optimal (see Arrow [1] , Pauly [13] ). It is only relatively recently, however, that economists have begun to undertake a systematic analysis of the properties of the secondbest allocations which will arise under these conditions. Much of this analysis has been concerned with what has become known as the principal-agent problem. Consider two individuals who operate in an uncertain environment and for whom risk sharing is desirable. Suppose that one of the individuals (known as the agent) is to take an action which the other individual (known as the principal) cannot observe. Assume that this action affects the total amount of consumption or money which is available to be divided between the two individuals. In general, the action which is optimal for the agent will depend on the extent of risk sharing between the principal and the agent. The question is: What is the optimal degree of risk sharing, given this dependence? Particular applications of the principal-agent problem have been made to the case of an insurer who cannot observe the level of care taken by the person being insured; to the case of a landlord who cannot observe the input decision of a tenant farmer (sharecropping); and to the case of an owner of a firm who cannot observe the effort level of a manager or worker. 2 Although considerable progress has been made in the recent literature towards understanding and solving the principal-agent problem (see, in particular, Harris and Raviv [6] , Holmstrom [7] , Mirrlees [10, 11, 12] , Shavell [19, 20] , as well as the other references in footnote 2), the mathematical approach which has been adopted in most of this literature is unsatisfactory. The procedure usually followed is to suppose that the principal chooses the risk-sharing contract, or incentive scheme, to maximize his expected utility subject to the constraints that (a) the agent's expected utility is no lower than some pre-specified level; (b) the agent's utility is at a stationary point, i.e., the agent satisfies his first-order conditions with respect to the choice of action. That is, the agent's second-order conditions (and the condition that the agent should be at a global rather than a local maximum) are ignored. Mirrlees [10] , however, in an important paper, has shown that this procedure is generally invalid unless, at the optimum, the solution to the agent's maximum problem is unique. In the absence of uniqueness (and it is difficult to guarantee uniqueness in advance), the first-order conditions derived by the above procedure are not even necessary conditions for the optimality of the risk-sharing contract.3
In Section 3, we use our approach to analyze the monotonicity and progressivity of the optimal incentive scheme. In Section 4, we give a simple algorithm for computing an optimal incentive scheme when there are only two outcomes associated with the agent's actions. In Section 5, we analyze the effects of risk aversion and information quality on the incentive problem. Finally, in Section 6 we consider some extensions of the analysis.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The application of the principal-agent problem that we will consider is to the case of the owner of a firm who delegates the running of the firm to a manager. The owner is the principal and the manager the agent. The owner is assumed not to be able to monitor the manager's actions. The owner does, however, observe the outcome of these actions, which we will take to be the firm's profit. It is assumed that the firm's profit depends on the manager's actions, but also on other factors which are outside the manager's control-we model these as a random component. Thus, in particular, if the firm does well, it will not generally be clear to the owner whether this is because the manager has worked well or whether it is because he has been lucky. 5 We will simplify matters by assuming that there are only finitely many possible gross profit levels for the firm, denoted ql, . . . , qn, where q1 < q2 < . . . < qn. We will assume that the principal is interested only in the firm's net profit, i.e. gross profit minus the payment to the manager. We will also assume that the principal is risk neutral-our methods of analysis can, however, be applied to the case where the principal is risk averse (see Remark 3 and Section 6).
Let A be the set of actions available to the manager. We will assume that A is a non-empty, compact subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space. Let S = { x E R I x > 0, En=1 7Xi = 1 }. We assume that there is a continuous function 7T: A -* S, where 7T(a) = (wj(a), ... , wn(a)) gives the probabilities of the n outcomes ql, . . . , qn if action a is selected. It is assumed that, when the agent chooses a E A, he knows the probability function 7T but not the outcome which will result from his action. We assume that the agent has a von NeumannMorgenstern utility function U(a, I) which depends both on his action a and his remuneration I from the principal. We include a as an argument in order to capture the idea that the agent dislikes working hard, taking care, etc.
The crucial assumption that we will make about the form of U(a, I) is: 
CFB(a) ? CFB(a') =-G(a) + K(a)v < G(a') + K(a')v for all v E Qt1 G(a) +
K(a)v < G(a') + K(a')v for some v E Qt. This in turn implies that the ordering > is independent of U. In the second-best situation where a is not observed by the principal, it is not possible to make the agent's remuneration depend on a. Instead, the principal will pay the agent according to the outcome of his action, i.e. according to the firm's profit. An incentive scheme is therefore an ndimensional vector I = (II , I2' ... . In) & In, where Ii is the agent's remuneration in the event that the firm's profit is q*. Given the incentive scheme I, the agent will choose a E A to maximize En= 17Tj(a) U(a, Ii).
We will assume that the principal knows the agent's utility function U(a, I), the set A and the function 7 :A -S.
In other words, the principal is fully informed about the agent and about the firm's production possibilities. The incentive problem which we will study therefore arises entirely because the principal cannot monitor the agent's actions. 7 The principal's problem can be described as follows. Let F be the set of pairs of incentive schemes I* and actions a* such that, under I*, the agent will be willing to work for the principal and will find it optimal to choose a*, i.e.
maxa EAn
Ii (a) U(a,IP) = En= 17j(a*)U(a*,PI*)> U. Then the principal chooses (I, a) E F to maximize En= I7Ti(a)(qi -I). It simplifies matter considerably if we break this problem up into two parts. We consider first, given that the principal wishes to implement a*, the least cost way of achieving this. We then consider which a* should be implemented. Thus, to begin, suppose that the principal wishes the agent to pick a particular action a* E A. To find the least (expected) cost way of achieving this, the principal must solve the following 7This distinguishes our study from the literature on incentive compatibility; see, e.g., the recent Review of Economic Studies symposium [16] . The incentive compatibility literature has been concerned with incentive problems arising from differences in information between individuals rather than with those arising from monitoring problems. In cases of differential information, there is a role for an exchange of information through messages, whereas in the model we study messages would serve no purpose. The important point to realize is that the constraints in (2.2) are linear in the vj's. Furthermore, V concave implies h convex, and so the objective function is convex in the vi's. Thus (2.2) is a rather simple optimization problem: minimize a convex function subject to (a possibly infinite number of) linear constraints. In particular, when A is a finite set, the Kuhn-Tucker theorem yields necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. These will be analyzed later.
It is important to realize that, in the absence of Assumption Al, it is not generally possible to convert (2.1) into a convex problem in this way. The above constitutes the first step(s) of the principal's optimization problem: for each a E A, compute C(a). The second step is to choose which action to implement, i.e. to choose a E A to maximize B(a) -C(a). This second problem will not generally be a convex problem. This is because even if B (a) is concave in a, C(a) will not generally be convex. Fortunately, a significant amount of information about the form of the optimal incentive scheme can be obtained by studying the first step alone. DEFINITION: A second-best optimal action a is one which maximizes B(a) -C(a) on A. A second-best optimal incentive scheme I is one that implements a second-best optimal action a at least expected cost, i.e. En=l7i( = c(a).
Note that for a second-best optimal incentive scheme to exist, the greatest lower bound in the definition of C(a) must actually be achieved. In order to establish the existence of a second-best optimal action and a second-best optimal incentive scheme, we need a further assumption.
ASSUMPTION A3: For all a E A and i = I, ... , n, 7Ti(a) > 0.
Since there are only finitely many possible profit levels, Assumption A3 implies that 7Ti(a) is bounded away from zero. Hence Assumption A3 rules out cases studied by Mirrlees [12] in which an optimum can be approached but not achieved by imposing higher and higher penalties on the agent which occur with smaller and smaller probability if the agent chooses the right action. PROPOSITION 1: Assume A1-A3. Then there exists a second-best optimal action a and a second-best optimal incentive scheme I. PROOF: It is helpful to split the proof up into two parts. Consider first the case where V is linear. Then it is easy to see that the principal can do as well in the second-best as in the first-best where the agent can be monitored. For let a* maximize B(a) -CFB(a) on A. Let the principal offer the agent the incentive scheme Ii = qi-t, where t = B(a*) -CFB(a*). Then the principal's profit will be B(a*) -CFB(a*) whatever the agent does. On the other hand, by picking a = a*, the agent can obtain expected utility U. Hence Proposition 1 certainly holds when V is linear.
On the other hand, suppose V is not linear. We show first, that, if the constraint set is nonempty for an action a* E A, then problem (2.2) has a solution, i.e. Z7%1vj(a*)h(v1) achieves its greatest lower bound C(a*). Note that zi = ITi(a*)vi is bounded below on the 6onstraint set of (2.2). It therefore follows from a result of Bertsekas [2] that unbounded sequences in the constraint set make Zn=7 1(a*)h(v1) tend to infinity (roughly because the variance of the vj-oo while their mean is bounded below, and h is convex and nonlinearAssumption A3 is important here). Hence, we can artificially bound the constraint set. Since the constraint set is closed, the existence of a minimum therefore follows from Weierstrass' theorem.
We We have thus established the existence of a second-best optimal action, a, when V is nonlinear. Since we have also shown that (2.2) has a solution as long as the constraint set is non-empty and V is nonlinear, this establishes the existence of a second-best optimal incentive scheme.
Q.E.D.
It is interesting to ask whether the constraint that the agent's expected utility be greater than or equal to U is binding at a second-best optimum. The answer is no in general, i.e. for incentive reasons it may pay the principal to choose an incentive scheme which gives the agent an expected utility in excess of U. One case where this will not happen is when the agent's utility function is additively or multiplicatively separable in action and reward: Most of Proposition 3 is well known. Proposition 3(2) and (6) can be understood as follows. In the first-best situation, if the agent is strictly risk averse, the principal bears all the risk and the agent bears none. In the second best situation, this is generally undesirable. For if the agent is completely protected from risk, then he has no incentive to work hard; i.e., he will choose a E A to minimize CFB(a). Hence the second-best situation is strictly worse from a welfare point of view than the first-best situation. The exception is when the agent is risk neutral, in which case it is optimal both from a risk sharing and an incentive point of view for him to bear all the risk, or when the first-best optimal action is cost minimizing.
In the case of Proposition 3(3) and 3(4), a scheme in which the agent is penalized very heavily if certain outcomes occur can be used to achieve the first best. This relates to results obtained in Mirrlees [12] . REMARK 3: We have assumed that the principal is risk neutral. Our analysis generalizes to the case where the principal is risk averse, however. In this case, instead of choosing v to minimize Z7Ti(a*)h(v1) in problem (2.2), we choose v to maximize E7Ti(a*) Up (q -h(vi)), where Up is the principal's utility function. Note that (2.2) is still a convex problem. Although we can no longer analyze costs and benefits separately, we can, for each a* E A, define a net benefit function maxv2vZi(a*) Up (q -h(vi)). An optimal action for the principal is now one that maximizes net benefits. See also Section 6 on this.
REMARK 4: We have taken the outcomes observed by the principal to be profit levels. Our analysis generalizes, however, to the case where the outcomes are more complicated objects, such as vectors of profits, sales, etc., or to the case where profits are not observed at all but something else is (see, e.g., Mirrlees [11] ). The important point to realize is that profit does not appear in the cost minimization problem (2.1) or (2.2). Thus, if the principal observes the realizations of a signal 0, then Ii refers to the payment to the agent when 0 i . Let C(a, 0) be the cost of implementing a when the information structure is 0 (e.g. if 0 reveals a exactly, then C(a, 0) = CFB(a)). Note that if the distribution of output is generated by a production function f(a, w), such that the marginal distribution of w is independent of the information structure, then B (a) = Ef(a, w-) = E [E [f(a, w-) I 01]] is independent of the information structure, given a. It follows that the effect of changes in the information structure is summarized by the way that C(a, 0) changes when the information structure changes. As will be seen in Section 5, this is quite easy to analyze.
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF OPTIMAL INCENTIVE 'CHEMES
It is of interest to know whether the optimal incentive scheme is monotone increasing (i.e., whether the agent is paid more when a higher output is observed) and whether the scheme is progressive (i.e., whether the marginal benefit to the agent of increased output is decreasing in output). These questions are quite difficult to answer because of the informational role of output. As we noted in the introduction, the agent may be given a low income at intermediate levels of output in order to discourage particular effort levels. Nevertheless, some general results about the shape of optimal schemes can be established. We begin with the following lemma. Q.E.D.
We now use Lemma 1 to show that an optimal incentive scheme will have the property that the principal's and agent's returns are positive related over some range of output levels; i.e., it is not optimal to have, for all output levels q*, qj: I, > Ij X -I, < qj-I. The proof proceeds by showing that, if the principal's and agent's payments are negatively related, then a twist in the incentive schedule which raises the agent's payment in high return states for the principal and lowers it in low return states for the principal can make the principal better off. The reason is that such a twist will be good for incentives since it gets the agent to put more probability weight on states yielding the principal a high return, and it is also good for risk-sharing since it raises the agent's return in low return states for the agent and lowers the agent's return in high return states for the agent. Since the incentive and risk-sharing effects reinforce each other, the principal is made better off.
In order to bring about both the incentive and risk-sharing effects, the twist in the incentive scheme must be chosen carefully. It is for this reason that the proof of the next proposition may seem rather complicated at first sight. If we can show that E wi(a)h(v1') < Z7Ti(a)h(vj), it will follow that i (a')(qi -h(v')) >E 7Ti(a)(qi -h(v1)),
i.e., the principal is better off.
To see that E wi(a)h(v1') < Ewi(a)h(vi), note that 7T1i(a)(h (vi) -h (v')) > E 7Ti(a)h'(v')(vi -v) by the convexity of h (here h' is the right-hand derivative if h is not differentiable)
. It suffices therefore to show that the latter expression is positive. By (3.3),
ETi (a) h'(vi')V-vi') = v 7Ti(a)h (vi)(h(vi)-Xq + I
Suppose that this is nonpositive for small X. Divide by X and let X -> 0. Assuming without loss of generality ti/X converges to i (we allow i infinite) and that h'(v') converges to h', and using the fact that v' -vi, we get for some k. Note that there is an interesting contrast between Proposition 4 and results found in the literature on optimal risk sharing in the absence of moral hazard. In this literature (see Borch [4] ), it is shown that (if the individuals are risk averse) it is optimal for the individuals' returns to be positively related over the whole range of outcomes, whereas here we are only able to show that this is true over some range of outcomes. Proposition 4 may be used to establish the following result about the monotonicity of the optimal incentive scheme. Proposition 5 says that it is not optimal for the agent's marginal reward as a function of income to be negative everywhere or to be greater than or equal to one everywhere.8 However, the proposition does allow for the possibility that either of these conditions can hold over some interval. To see when this may occur, it is useful to consider in more detail the case where A is a finite set. When A is finite, we can use the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for problem (2.2) to characterize the optimum. If Assumption A3 holds and h is differentiable, these yield: solution. In other words, we can substitute A' = (a E A I a is at least as costly as a*} for A in (2.2) and the solution will not change. But since a* is now the least costly action, we know from the proof of Proposition 1 that it is optimal to set Ii = Ij for all i, j. However, Ii = Ij is not optimal for the original problem since, under these conditions, the agent will pick an a which minimizes CFB(a), and by assumption CFB (a*) > mina EA CFB (a). Contradiction.
That Ai > 0 follows from the fact that if all the yj = 0, then h'(vi) is the same for all i, which implies that I1 = .. = In; however, this means that the agent will choose a cost-minimizing action, contradicting CFB(a*) > minaEA CFB(a).
It should be noted that Proposition 6 depends strongly on the assumption that A is finite.
The simplest case occurs when yj > 0 for just one aj with CFB(aj) < CFB(a*) (this will be true in particular if A contains only two actions). In this case, we can rewrite (3.9) as ( 
3.10) h'(vi) = (X + tt)K(a*) -ttK(aj) -( a* .
We see that what determines vi, and hence Ii, in this case is the relative likelihood that the outcome q = qi results from a1 rather than from a*. In particular, since h convex =X h' nondecreasing in vi, a sufficient condition for the optimal incentive scheme to be nondecreasing everywhere, i.e. I, < '2 < ? .. <In, is that gi(aj)/1i(a*) is nonincreasing in i, i.e. the relative likelihood that a = a1 rather than a = a* produces the outcome q = qi is lower the better is the outcome i. This observation has led some to suggest that the following is a sufficient conditon for the incentive scheme to be nondecreasing. It should be noted that the "first-order condition" approach described in the introduction, which is based on the assumption that the agent is indifferent between a and a + da at an optimum, does yield MLRC as a sufficient condition for monotonicity.9 We now show, however, that, once we take into account the possibility that the agent may be indifferent between several actions at an 9See Mirrlees [11] or Holmstrom [7] . Milgrom [9] has shown that MLRC, as stated here, implies the differential version of the monotone likelihood condition which is to be found in Mirrlees [11] or Holmstrom [7] . optimum, i.e. yj > 0 for more than one aj, MLRC does not guarantee monotonicity. C(a,) , it is easy to show that we can find q1 < q2 < q3 such that B (a2) -C(a2) > max[B(a3) -C(a3), B(a,) -C(a,) ]. But this means that it is optimal for the principal to get the agent to pick a2. Hence the optimal incentive scheme is as described above. It is not nondecreasing despite the satisfaction of MLRC.
The reason that monotonicity breaks down in Example 1 is because, at the optimum, the agent is indifferent between a2, the action to be implemented, a1 a less costly action, and a3 a more costly action. By MLRC gr (a1)fir(a2), gi(a2) /1,g(a3) are decreasing in i. However, Aj(7Tr(aj)f7Tw(a2)) + 2(qTi(a3)/i(a2)) need not be monotonic.
This observation suggests that one way to get monotonicity is to strengthen MLRC so that it holds for weighted combinations of actions as well as for the '0The function V violates (2) of Assumption Al, but this is unimportant for the example. A is compact, there exist a, a E A  such that a < a < a for all a E A. Given a E A, consider X(?T, ()/r, (a)) + (1 -X)(Q,(a)/r, (a) ). When A = 1, this is nondecreasing in i, and when A = 0, it is nonincreasing in i. Furthermore, (3.11) implies that it is monotonic in i for all 0 < A < 1. It follows by continuity that it is independent of i for some 0<A< 1. action and let I be the second-best optimal incentive scheme which implements it. By Remark 2 of Section 2, I is unique. Let Ar be a finite subset of A containing a such that the Euclidean distance between Ar and A is less than (1/r). Let Ir be the second-best optimal incentive scheme which implements a when the agent is restricted to choosing from Ar. From Proposition 7 for the finite A case, we know that Ir is nondecreasing. Take limits as r -4 0. It is straightforward to show that Ir -I. It follows that I is nondecreasing.
Q.E.D.
An alternative sufficient condition for monotonicity may be found in the work of Mirrlees [12] , who establishes a similar result to Proposition 8 below . For each  a E A, let F(a) = (7T,(a), 7Tw(a) + 7T2(a) 
U-G(a')
But this contradicts (3.13) and (3.14). To prove the result for A finite, one again proceeds by way of finite approximation.
Q.E.D. constant. Suppose that MLRC and CDFC hold and that (qi+I -qi) is independent of i, 1 < i < n -1. Then a second-best optimal incentive scheme will be regressive (resp. progressive) if 
To understand CDFC, consider, for each a E A, V(CFB(a)) =((U -G(a)) /K(a)). In utility terms V(CFB(a)) is a measure of the first-best cost of getting the agent to pick a. CDFC says that if a is a convex combination of a' and a" in

Note that I/V' is linear if V=logI; is concave if V= -e', a >0, or V= I', 0 < a < 1; is convex if V = -I-,
a > 1. It should also be noted that Mirrlees [12] has shown that if CDFC holds, the "first-order condition" approach referred to in the introduction is valid. Thus Propositions 8 and 9 can also be proved by appealing to the characterization of an optimal incentive scheme to be found in much of the literature (see, e.g., Holmstrom [ 
7] and Mirrlees [11]).
Let us summarize the results of this section. We have shown that an optimal incentive scheme will not be declining everywhere, but that only under quite strong assumptions (SC or MLRC plus concavity) will it be nondecreasing everywhere. We have also shown that it is not optimal for the agent's marginal remuneration for an extra pound of profit to exceed one everywhere, although it may exceed one sometimes. Finally, we have obtained sufficient conditions for the incentive scheme to be progressive or regressive.
The conclusion that only under strong assumptions will the optimal incentive scheme be monotonic may seem disappointing at first sight. One feels that monotonicity is a minimal requirement. This may not be the right reaction, however. There are many interesting situations where it is clear that the optimal scheme will not be monotonic. We have described one example in the introduction. Another example is the following. Suppose that actions are two dimensional, with one dimension referring to how hard the agent works and the other dimension to how cautious he is-greater caution might lead to a lower variance of profit but also to a lower mean. The optimal action for the principal might involve the agent working fairly hard and also not being too cautious. The best way to implement this may be to pay the agent high amounts for both very good outcomes (to encourage high effort) and very bad outcomes (to discourage excessive caution). This example seems far from pathological. In fact, one might argue that a number of real world incentive schemes operate in this way. In view of examples like this, the difficulty of finding general conditions guaranteeing monotonicity may become less surprising. 12 In the next section, we show that considerably stronger results than those of this section can be proved for the case n = 2. We also provide a simple algorithm for computing optimal incentive schemes when n = 2.
THE CASE OF TWO OUTCOMES
When n = 2, we will refer to q, as the "bad" outcome and q2> q, as the "good" outcome. In this case, the agent's incentive scheme can be represented simply by a fixed payment w and a share of profits, s, where w + sq1 = II, w + sq2 = I2' i.e., s = (I2-Il)/(q2-q1). Proposition 5 of the last section shows that it is not optimal for Ii to be everywhere declining in qi. When n = 2, this means that s > 0. 13 Similarly the proposition implies that s < 1 when n = 2. This has a number of interesting implications. DEFINITION: Let n = 2. We say that a E A is efficient if there does not exist a' E A satisfying CFB(a') < CFB (a) and 7T2(a') > 7T2(a), with at least one strict inequality.
In other words, an action is efficient if the probability of a good outcome can only be increased by incurring greater cost. PROPOSITION with at least one strict inequality unless CFB(a)= CFB(a') and v1 = v2. This contradicts the optimality of a unless CFB(a) = CFB(a') and v1 = v2. However, in this case, the agent is indifferent between a and a', while the principal prefers a', again contradicting the optimality of a.
Q.E.D.
We may use Proposition 10 to prove that when n = 2 it will never pay the principal to offer the agent an expected utility in excess of U (recall that when n > 2 this is only generally true when U(a, I) is additively or multiplicatively separable-see Proposition 2). A1(4)). Hence 7T,(a')v, + 72(a')v2 > 7T(a)vl +  7T2(a)v2, which implies, since v2 > vI by Proposition 5, that 7T2(a') > 7J2(a) We may use Propositions 10-12 to develop a method for computing a second-best optimal incentive scheme when n = 2. Consider the case where A is finite. Recall that Proposition 6 states that, in this case, the agent will be indifferent between a* and some less costly action. This fact makes the computation of an optimal incentive scheme fairly straightforward. We know from Proposition 10 that it is never optimal to get the agent to choose an inefficient action. Hence we can assume without loss of generality that CFB(al) < CFB(a2) < ... < CFB(am) and 7T2(aI) < 7T2(a2) cost function C(a) but a  modified cost function C(a). Clearly, C(a) < C(a) for each a since more actions  can only make implementation more difficult. On the other hand, Proposition 12  tells us that maxaEA[B(a) -C(a)] < maxaeA [B(a) -C(a) *)V(I,)) )/da] = 0 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the agent to pick a*. In the latter case, Mirrlees [12] has shown that the first-order condition approach referred to in the introduc_tion is valid.
One may ask also whether Propositions 10 and 12 hold in the case n > 2. The answer is no (but see Remark 7 below). Second-best optimal actions may be inefficient; i.e., there may exist lower cost actions which dominate the optimal action in the sense of first degree stochastic dominance.14 Also the addition of actions costlier than the second-best optimal action may make the principal worse off (in Example 1, the principal's expected profits increase if action a3 14LetA = {a1,a2,a3}, n = 3. Assume CFB(aI) < CFB(a2) < CFB(a3), and that 7r(aI) = (3/4, 1/8,  1/8), 7r(a2) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) , qr(a3) = (1/2, 1/2, 0) (Assumption A3 is violated, but this is unimportant.) Then C(al) = CFB(al) since a, is the least cost action, and C(a3) = CFB(a3) since a3 can be implemented by setting II = I2, I3 = -oo. However, C(a2) > CFB(a2) and, in fact, if the agent is very risk averse, C(a2) will be so big that it is profitable for the principal to implement a3 rather than a2 (the effect of risk aversion on C(a) is discussed in Section 5). This is in spite of the fact that a3 is inefficient relative to a2. becomes unavailable to the agent). Finally, as Shavell [19] has noted the agent may choose a higher cost action when there are opportunities to share risks with a principal than in the absence of these opportunities. REMARK 7: It is interesting to note that it is possible to extend all the results of the n = 2 case to the n > 2 case when the spanning condition (SC) holds. This is because when SC holds, both the principal and the agent are essentially choosing between lotteries of the probability vectors 7T 
WHAT DETERMINES HOW SERIOUS THE INCENTIVE PROBLEM IS?
In previous sections, we have studied the properties of an optimal incentive scheme. We turn now to a consideration of the factors which determine the magnitude of L, the loss to the principal from being unable to observe the agent's action.
One feels intuitively that the worse is the quality of the information about the agent's action that the principal obtains from observing any outcome, the more serious will be the incentive problem. This idea can be formalized as follows. Suppose that we start with an incentive problem in which the agent's action set is A, his utility function is U, his reservation utility is U, the probability function is 7T, and the vector of outputs is q = (ql, The transformation from 7g(a) to Rk(a) corresponds to a decrease in informativeness in the sense of Blackwell (see, e.g., Blackwell and Girshick [3] ). 15 That is, if we think of the actions a E A as being parameters with respect to which we '5The possibility of using Blackwell's notion of informativeness to characterize the seriousness of an incentive problem was suggested by Holmstrom [7] . have a prior probability distribution, then an experimenter who makes deductions about a from observing ql, ... , qn would prefer to face the function 7T than the function Rk. PROPOSITION (I',. .. , In) be the cost minimizing way of implementing a in the primed problem. Suppose that in the unprimed problem, the principal offers the agent the following random incentive scheme: for each i, if qi is the outcome, an n-sided die will be thrown where the probability of side j coming up is rjf, the (j, i)th element of R (j = 1, ... , n). If sidej then comes up, you get Ij. With this random incentive scheme, the probability of the agent getting Ij' if he chooses a particular action is the same as in the primed problem. Therefore the agent's optimal action will be a. Furthermore, the principal's expected costs are the same as in the primed problem. This shows that the principal can implement a at least as cheaply in the unprimed problem as in the primed problem by using a random incentive scheme. The final part of the proof is to note that the principal can reduce his expected cost further and continue to implement a by offering the agent the perfectly certain utility level vi = E= rj V(Ij') if the outcome is qi rather than the above lottery. That is, there is a deterministic incentive scheme which is better for the principal than the above random incentive scheme.
REMARK 8: The last part of the proof of Proposition 13 shows that it is never desirable under our assumptions for the principal to offer the agent an incentive scheme which makes his payment conditional on a particular outcome a lottery rather than a perfectly certain income.17 This result may also be found in Holmstrom [7] .
Note that if g' = R7T and q'R = q, the random variable q' will have the same mean as q. In this case the following is true: for all a E A. Hence the agent will prefer actions a with CFB(a) < CFB(a*) to a*. This contradicts the assumption that the incentive scheme implements a*.
We turn now to a consideration of another factor which influences L: the agent's degree of risk aversion. Since no incentive problem arises when the agent is risk netural, but an incentive problem does arise when the agent is risk averse, one is led to ask whether L increases as the agent becomes more risk averse. One difficulty in answering this question in general is the following. The way one makes the agent more risk averse is to replace his utility function U(I,a) by H( U (I, a) ) where H is a real-valued, increasing, concave function. However, if U satisfies Assumption Al, then H( U) will generally not. To get around this difficulty, we will confine our attention to the case where A is a subset of the real line, V(I) = -e-kI, G(a) = 0, and K(a) = eka, i.e., the agent's utility function is U(a,I) = -e-k(I-a), where k >0. Assume also that U= -e-ka, i.e., the agent's outside opportunity is represented by the perfectly certain income a. An increase in risk aversion can then be represented simply by an increase in k.
Note that if the agent's utility function is -e -k( -a) and U= -e -ka, then CFB(a) = a + a, which is independent of k. Hence first best profits are independent of k. Since the marginal product of labor of the agent-that is, the increase in expected profit resulting from an extra pound of expenditure by the agent-is proportional to 1 /X, Proposition 17 can be interpreted as saying that the welfare loss L is of a smaller order of magnitude than the reciprocal of the agent's marginal product of labor.
EXTENSIONS
We have assumed throughout the paper that the principal is risk-neutral and that the agent's attitudes to risk over income lotteries are independent of action -Assumption Al. We now briefly consider what happens if we relax these assumptions.
As we have noted in Section 2, Remark 3, our method of analysis generalizes without any difficulty to the case where the principal is risk-averse. Specific results change, however, The main difference is that now, even in the first-best situation, the principal will not bear all the risk. One implication of this is that even if there is no disutility of action for the agent, i.e. a does not enter the agent's utility function, the first-best will not generally be reached. The reason is that there may be a conflict between the principal and agent over what income lottery should be selected (for a study of this conflict, see Ross [17] The computational procedure presented in Section 4 for the two outcome case can be extended to the case where the principal is risk-averse. In the finite action case, it is still true that the agent will be indifferent between two actions at the optimum, except in the case where the first-best can be achieved. Thus it is necessary to check whether the first-best can be achieved. Otherwise the procedure is unaltered.
We turn now to the consequences of relaxing Assumption Al. These are much more serious since most of our analysis has depended crucially on being able to choose the control variables V(Ij), . . . , V(I,) independently of a. Some results do generalize, however. In particular one can show that Propositions 1, 3, 10, and 12 generalize. It seems unlikely that the characterization of an optimal incentive scheme in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, part 1, holds, but we do not have a counterexample. Surprisingly, perhaps, Proposition 5, part 2 does hold. Proposition 6 does not hold and it seems unlikely that Propositions 7-9 do.
In the two outcome case, one can still show that it is optimal for the agent's share s to satisfy 0 < s < 1. As a consequence Propositions 10 and 12 generalize. Proposition 11 does not generalize, however, and nor does our computational procedure for the two outcome case. Propositions 13 and 14 and Corollary 1 of Proposition 14 do not hold as they stand, although they do if one enlarges the set of feasible incentive schemes to include random schemes. (As we have noted in footnote 17, once Assumption Al is dropped, random incentive schemes may be superior to deterministic schemes.) Finally, it seems likely that Proposition 17 could be generalized to the nonseparable case.
SUMMARY
The purpose of this paper has been to develop a method for analyzing the principal-agent problem in the case where the agent's attitudes to income risk are independent of action. Our method consists of breaking up the principal's problem into a computation of the costs and benefits accruing to the principal when the agent takes a particular action. We have used this method to establish a number of results about the structure of the optimal incentive scheme and about the determinants of the welfare loss resulting from the principal's inability to observe the agent's action. We have shown that it is never optimal for the incentive scheme to be such that the principal's and agent's payoff are negatively related over the whole outcome range, although such a relationship may be optimal over part of the range. We have found sufficient conditions for the incentive scheme to be monotonic, progressive, and regressive. We have shown that a decrease in the quality of the principal's information in the sense of Blackwell increases welfare loss. When there are only two outcomes, welfare loss also increases when the agent becomes more risk averse. Finally, we have discussed how our techniques can be used to compute optimal incentive schemes in particular cases.
While we have talked throughout about "the" principal-agent problem, we have in fact been considering the simplest of a number of such problems. More complicated principal-agent problems arise when not only is the principal unable to monitor the agent, but also the agent possesses information about his environment, i.e. about A, gr, or U(a, I), which the principal does not. Such problems possess a number of features of the preference revelation problems studied in the recent incentive compatibility literature; see, for example, the Review of Economic Studies Symposium [16] . A start has been made in the analysis of such problems by Harris and Raviv [6] , Holmstrom [7] , and Mirrlees [12] . It will be interesting to see whether the techniques presented here will also be useful in the solution of these more complicated principal-agent problems. 
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